

This is a summary of a two-part series that examines the wide ambit of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act), through the lens of the Delhi High Court’s recent ruling in Chitra Ramkrishna v. Union of India on the meaning and reach of the term “public servant”.
Chitra Ramkrishna, the former Managing Director and CEO of the National Stock Exchange (NSE), is being prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act) in connection with the NSE “co-location” scam. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court recently dismissed her constitutional challenge to the definitions of “public servant” under the PC Act. The Court noted that while the definition may be broad, it need not be unconstitutional. However, even as it refused to quash the prosecution, the Court refrained from adjudicating the jurisdictional question of whether the head of the NSE could personally be treated as a “public servant”, leaving that question to be determined at trial. Subsequently, the Apex Court of the country dismissed her Special Leave Petition in appeal, directing the Trial Court to decide the issue on its own merits.
The authors argue that while the judgment was correct on certain issues, it missed an important opportunity. The Court was on solid ground in rejecting the constitutionality challenge and holding that the NSE performs a “public duty”. However, it declined to deal with the more important jurisdictional question of whether the individual who ran the institution is herself a public servant. This could have been a good opportunity for the Court to flesh out the details of how and what public duties an individual must perform, personally, to be brought within the definition of “public servant”, which is an individual-focused definition. The article also questions whether deferring the applicability of the PC Act to trial satisfies the principle of fair warning under law and highlights the unresolved tension between the anti-corruption canon and the rule of strict construction of penal statutes.
The article contends that the larger impact of this reasoning falls on private companies that perform public-facing or regulated work. If the operative logic is that an entity performs a public duty and therefore its officers are public servants, the exposure extends well beyond stock exchanges to any institution that performs what a court might characterise as a public duty, a category that appears to be ever-expanding. Boards and their advisers would therefore be prudent to start from a position of assuming that senior management of regulated private entities may be treated as public servants under the PC Act. The recommended response is robust anti-bribery controls, documented “adequate procedures”, and board records capable of demonstrating whether a particular officer’s role did or did not carry the public duty a prosecutor might allege.
For a more detailed analysis, read the full two-part series: [Part One] and [Part Two].