BRIBEline: Business Registry for International Bribery and Extortion

The private sector is working to reduce the payment of bribes in international commerce, but we have lost sight of the government officials who abuse the public's trust -- government officials who turn their public office into a private cash cow. There is no question that participation by corporations in corrupt schemes is illegal and unethical, or that it undermines free trade and represents a hidden tax on the local community. Allegations of bribes paid by companies should be investigated and, where the evidence supports it, the bribe-payers prosecuted. What are the risks to the government official? He may have to share a portion of his take with colleagues, superiors or, if things go badly, a corrupt judiciary. Countries with the greatest levels of corruption offer the briber-taker the most options for avoiding prosecution.

Watchdog NGOs keep an eye on companies. Whistleblowers expose corporate bribes. Prosecutors investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute. Who is watching the government officials? Often, it is governmental committees susceptible to bribes themselves or, more likely, so desperately under-funded that they can do little more than shake their heads. This leaves aside the problem of those countries where exposing bribery schemes lands the civic minded in jail or worse.

For governments serious about helping to root out bribery, it is time to provide corporations with a whistleblower option of their own. Companies know where many of the problems lie. Within an industry, there are often government officials who are notorious for demanding their share and wreaking havoc if it isn't forthcoming. Currently, companies do nothing with this information. The best among them simply decline to pay. No company willingly risks the adverse publicity or scrutiny that a public denunciation would entail and no company will risk alienating the foreign government by fingering one official without knowing where the scheme begins or ends. Bribe-takers rarely act alone.

Currently, corrupt government officials can seek bribes from multinationals doing business in their country with complete impunity. The company may say no, but it won't cry foul. Emboldened by this, the government official need only cast its net wider, making demands on more companies. He need only keep his hand out as he walks down the line of possible bribe payers. There is no cost to the transaction for the official, beyond the time it takes for him to broach the subject.

Imagine how that might change if an international body were tracking these demands? Companies could report such demands, voluntarily and anonymously, just as individual whistleblowers do now. A reasonable level of detail would be required to minimize abuse of the reporting channel, but the report need not meet a rigid evidentiary standard as prosecution would not be the goal. This should not be a roving squad of investigators. Instead, it should be an office that receives and records allegations, tracks trends where information is currently lost and shines light where there is none now.

Key Features of the proposed BRIBEline:

Information provided must be detailed and should include the official's name, ministry or department, the nature of his/her demand, if specified (cash, goods, or other benefits), scope of the project tainted by the request, nature of the threatened consequences, if specified (delay, lack of access, loss of contract, etc.).

Confidentiality of the reporting company - both nominal and effective confidentiality - is critical. There can be no mention of the reporting company's name, or indirect identification clues such "a major Dutch oil company operating in Nigeria". We will also have to deal with confidentiality in situations where there is a large contract and only two bidders. The winner will not report so by elimination the losing company increases its risk of identification.

Verification of the information submitted will be important for credibility of the process. Not all reports will need to be verified. A dollar threshold should be established above which individual notifications will be verified by an independent party. For small bribes required to induce government officials to undertake a routine governmental task (so-called "facilitating payments"), verification will be less important as there is no clear motive to misrepresent the facts.

Information gathered will be reported collectively to paint a broad picture by country-and if the number of reports permits and confidentiality can be preserved, by ministry - of attempts to solicit bribes. This information will not be used to intervene in individual transactions, but instead will be provided to governments to encourage remedial action.